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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case started as an action to quiet title to real property purchased in Madison County, 
Idaho. John Bagley and his brother, Terrence Bagley (collectively the Bagleys), purchased a 
small farm from Byron and Marilynn Thomason (Thomasons) for $141,563.05. The parties 
signed an agreement for the purchase of the property and the Thomasons conveyed the property 
via Warranty Deed. Following the purchase and sale a dispute arose as to ownership of the 
property and the Bagleys filed an action to quiet title to the real property. The Thomasons 
previously appealed the district court's order quieting title in the Bagleys' name. That appeal, 
Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 241P.3d972 (2010) (Bagley I), and a sister case pertaining 
to water rights, Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 806, 241 P.3d 979 (2010) (Bagley JI), were 
consolidated by order of the Supreme Court and decided in October 2010. The Court remanded 
the matter for entry of a final judgment as to all remaining issues in Bagley I. 
B. Course of Proceedings/Statement of Facts. 
In Bagley I, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly ruled that the Bagleys had standing to 
pursue the quiet title action. Bagley I, 149 Idaho at 802, 241 P.3d at 975. The Court found that 
the district court ruled appropriately, and had jurisdiction to rule, on all issues raised by the 
Thomasons in Bagley I. Id. at 799-804, 241 P.3d at 972-977. The Court ruled that the district 
court should not have decided substantive issues once the case had been appealed. Id. at 804, 
241 P.3d at 977 n.5. 
When the case was remanded back to the district court, the Bagleys sought entry of a 
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final judgment. On March 4, 2011, the Bagleys filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
for entry of final judgment along with briefing in support. (R Vol. II, pp. 334-42). While 
considering the Bagleys' motions, the district court stayed the proceedings and had a transcript 
of the hearing from March 9, 2009 prepared. (Id. at 355-60). On June 16, 2011, the district 
court granted the Bagleys' motion for judgment on the pleadings and for entry of final judgment. 
(Id. at 370-96). The district court also denied Thomasons' pending motions. (Id). That same 
day, the district court entered a separate FINAL JUDGMENT, quieting title in the Bagleys and 
affirmed Judge Moss' prior award of fees and costs. (R Vol. III, pp. 397-400). 
Being unwilling to accept the district court's findings, the Thomasons then filed a 470 
page document entitled "Counterplaintiffs' Joint Brief, Affidavits Objecting to Court's June 16, 
2011 Final Order and Objection to Courts Final Order 6/16/11 and Support for Motion to 
Reconsider IRCP Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) or in the Alternative New Trial IRCP 59(b); 59(d); 59(e) No 
Rule 54(B) Certificate Has Been Issued." (R Vol. III, p. 401-R. Vol. IV, p. 871). 
The Bagleys then filed a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
1 l(a)(l), including supporting briefing and affidavits. (R Vol. IV, pp. 872-945). The 
Thomasons continued to file various items with the district court. The district court ruled on 
Thomasons' Motion for Reconsideration on September 27, 2011. (R Vol. V, pp. 1146-1180). In 
the district court's order, the district court awarded the Bagleys their attorney fees "necessary to 
review and respond" to the Thomasons' Motion for Reconsideration. (Id). In a separate order, 
the district court referred part of the Bagleys' motion for sanctions to the Administrative Judge, 
Jon J. Shindurling, for a determination whether the Thomasons should be deemed vexatious 
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litigants and further sanctioned. (Id. at pp. 1141-45). Judge Shindurling has not yet made any 
findings or issued an order on the request to deem the Thomasons vexatious litigants. The 
district court awarded the Bagleys $5,997.50 as a sanction against Thomasons. (Id. at pp. 1230-
31). 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Bagleys are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 
12-121 & 12-123. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Bagleys are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and 
as the prevailing party under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tyler v. Keeney, 
128 Idaho 524, 915 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. 1996); see also IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 12-121 (2012); 
IDAHO R. Crv. P. 54 (2012). The Thomasons' appeal is frivolous; therefore, attorney fees are 
awardable pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121and12-123. See IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 12-121 & 
123. Idaho Appellate Rule 41 justifies the Bagleys' request for attorney fees on appeal and the 
Court may determine the amount awarded pursuant to this Rule. IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2012). This 
issue will be further addressed, infra. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
After spending nearly 37 pages of their brief on the factual history of the case, the 
Thomasons argue only four separate issues on appeal. All of the issues identified by the 
Thomasons were previously briefed, argued, and rejected by the Court in both Bagley I and 
Bagley II. The Thomasons do not identify a single error by the district court in the proceedings 
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following the Supreme Court's decisions in the prior appeals. The Thomasons are simply 
inviting the Court to revisit its prior decisions on appeal. The Court should decline to do so. 
Additionally, and as noted in the prior appellate briefing, the Thomasons appear prose. 
Litigants pro se are "held to the same standards and rules as those represented by attorneys." 
Huff v. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d 1244, 1246 (2006). "Idaho Appellate Rule 35 
requires parties to list and argue issues presented on appeal." (Id). "When issues presented on 
appeal are not supported by propositions of law, citation to legal authority, or argument they will 
not be considered by [the] Court." (Id). (citing Langley v. State, 126 Idaho 781, 784, 890 P.2d 
732, 735 (1995)). 
Appellate briefing is meant to be understood in order that the writer might persuade. 
Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010); City of Kansas City, Inc. v. 
Hayward, 954 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The Thomasons have briefed this case in a 
manner that is entirely incoherent and disconnected from the issues raised in the post-remand 
proceedings. Their briefing is "obscure and esoteric." (See id). The Thomasons' briefing is rife 
with pseudo-legalese, rhetoric, and legal citations. The Court should not consider the 
Thomasons' arguments because they lack "coherence, citation to applicable authority, citations 
to the record, or comprehensible argument." See Bach v. Bagley, 229 P.3d 1146 (Idaho 2010). 
A. The district court did not err in its orders. 
1. Standard of Review. 
Where a case is decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, for the purposes of 
appeal, the Court should accept the truth of appellants' allegations. See, e.g., Jones v. St. Maries, 
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727 P.2d 1161, 1162 (Idaho 1986) (citing Davenport v. Burke, 27 Idaho 464, 473, 149 P. 511, 
515 (1915)). A motion for judgment on the pleadings under I.R.C.P. 12(c) is identical to the 
federal rule of the same number. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is also treated in the 
same way as a motion made under Rule 12(b)(6). Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., 653 F.3d 1281, 
1285-86 (10th Cir. 2011 ). The standard of review for dismissal under 12(b )( 6) is the same as the 
standard ofreview for a summary judgment. Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 
123 Idaho 573, 578, 850 P.2d 724, 728 (1993). Summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 
Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 277 P.3d 374, 376 (Idaho 2012). 
2. The district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction. 
In Bagley II, the Court expressly decided the subject matter jurisdiction issue. The Court 
noted, "Thomasons have not shown that the district court lacked jurisdiction." Bagley II, 149 
Idaho at 808, 241 P.3d at 981. The same is true in this appeal. The Thomasons have not 
explained or demonstrated that the district court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate real property disputes. The Thomasons raise no new issues in this appeal. The sole 
basis for their argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction is Idaho Code§ 55-601, which 
the Court also rejected as a grounds for standing and, impliedly, subject matter jurisdiction. 
Bagley I, 149 Idaho at 802, 241 P.3d at 975. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type or class of 
dispute. Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007) (citing Boughton v. Price, 
70 Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950). As noted in Bach, "Article V, § 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution provides that the district court shall have original jurisdiction to hear all cases, both 
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at law and in equity." (Id). There can be no dispute that the district court possessed proper 
authority and jurisdiction to resolve a quiet title dispute pertaining to real property located within 
Idaho. 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction because Idaho Code§§ 6-401 & 418 
authorize district courts to hear actions to quiet title and to regain possession of real property. 
See IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 6-401, 418 (2012). Thus, the district court possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue all of the findings, orders, and judgments in this case. 
Additionally, this Court has already dealt with the arguments raised by the Thomasons 
about§ 55-601. The Court found that the Thomasons failed to raise the issue of compliance with 
§ 55-601 before the district court when the district court quieted title in the Bagleys. Bagley I, 
149 Idaho at 802, 241 P.3d at 975. Because the Thomasons did not properly raise or preserve the 
§ 55-601 issue before the district court and during the first appeal, they should not be permitted 
to raise it during this subsequent appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained this principle in 
Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1990). The Court stated: 
[U]nder the "law of the case" principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the courts 
generally will not consider errors which arose prior to the first appeal and which might 
have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal. This approach discourages piecemeal 
appeals and is consistent with the broad scope of claim preclusion under the analogous 
doctrine of res judicata. 
Id., 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399. See also Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 956, 842 P.2d 
288, 292 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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3. The Bagleys possess standing to bring the underlying lawsuit. 
This Court previously found that the Bagleys had standing to bring the quiet title action. 
Bagley I, 149 Idaho at 802, 241 P.3d at 975. The Court's findings in Bagley I are binding under 
the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine precludes relitigating issues in single 
cases and any subsequent proceedings after an appeal. See Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 278 
P.3d 943, 951(Idaho2012) (citing Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 
(2000)). "The 'law of the case' doctrine provides that when 'the Supreme Court, in deciding a 
case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such 
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal.'" Spur Prods. Corp. v. Stoel Rives 
LLP, 153 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Idaho 2007)(citing Swanson, 134 Idaho at 515, 5 P.3d at 976). Thus, 
the Court's prior ruling on the issue of standing is binding and the Thomasons provide no 
coherent argument or authority otherwise. 
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion. 
It is unclear from the Thomasons' briefing "how" the district court abused its discretion. 
The argument seems to suggest that the district court's refusal to dismiss the action because it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction constituted an abuse of discretion. However, as noted, supra, 
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Idaho's statutes conferred 
jurisdiction on the district court and this Court held that jurisdiction exists in this case in Bagley 
I. Thus to the extent the Thomasons' arguments are construed within the context of jurisdiction 
and standing the arguments have already been addressed and should be rejected. 
Respondents' Brief 7 
The Thomasons also do not raise any specific arguments about the attorney fee awards. 
The Thomasons challenged the interlocutory fee award in prior appeal and this Court rejected 
their arguments. Bagley I, 149 Idaho at 803-04, 241 P.3d at 976-77. In their appellant brief, the 
Thomasons identify no specific error committed by the district court in reaching any of the 
attorney fee awards in this case. The appellate courts of the State of Idaho have routinely 
declined to search an appellate record for unspecified errors. In Re Clark, 283 P.3d 96, 103 
(Idaho July 6, 2012); Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010); Idaho 
Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Idaho appellate courts require argument and a specific assignment of error under the Idaho 
Appellate Rules in order for an issue to be preserved and deemed properly brought before the 
Court. See Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). Whether the district 
court abused its discretion in awarding the Bagleys fees has not been specifically raised or 
articulated by the Thomasons in their appellate briefing. Therefore, the Court should decline to 
hear any argument on the attorney fee issue by the Thomasons. 
The Thomasons argue that the district court abused its discretion in failing to weigh 
conflicting evidence, including the original documents and the reconveyance agreement. 
However, the Thomasons never explain those documents' relevance to the Bagleys' motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. The Thomasons offer no rationale, no authority, and no argument 
that explains why those documents should have been sufficient to overcome the Bagleys' motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. The Thomasons' arguments focus on the quiet title issue and not 
the dismissal of the counterclaims. The failure to support of proposition with argument or 
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authority is fatal to that proposition on appeal. See Hurtado v. Land 0 'Lakes, Inc., 278 P.3d 415, 
420 (Idaho May 29, 2012) (citing Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 16, 175 P.3d 
172, 178 (2007) ). As a result of the Tho masons' failure to properly raise the issue of judgment 
on the pleadings to this Court, their appeal should be denied and the Court should find that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Bagleys' judgment on the pleadings. 
5. There is no evidence of fraud. 
The Thomasons never presented the district court with any evidence of fraud by the 
Bagleys, Bagleys' counsel, or any other individual or entity involved in this case. The 
Thomasons' claims of fraud are spurious. The Thomasons raised the issue of fraud in Bagley I 
and Bagley II. These issues, having previously been raised, are not properly before the Court. 
There was no explanation ever offered to the district court by the Thomasons how or why the 
Bagleys were engaging in fraud upon the district court in connection with the request for 
judgment on the pleadings. The district court's findings that there was an absence of evidence of 
fraudulent conduct and that the claims by the Thomasons were meritless have not been properly 
preserved or challenged on appeal. The Court should deny the Thomasons' appeal to the extent 
that they seek relief based upon fraudulent conduct. 
6. The Thomasons' Equal Protection argument fails. 
The Thomasons make conclusory statements that they were somehow denied equal 
protection under the laws of the United States of America. However, as with all other positions 
taken by the Thomasons on appeal, the Thomasons utterly failed to support their conclusory 
statements with authority or argument. They cite some cases for generic legal propositions as 
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opposed to anything remotely applicable to this case. The Thomasons have not identified that 
they are members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. They have not shown that the laws of 
which they complain violate the principles of equal protection or that they have any 
discriminatory impact on the Thomasons. The Thomasons had access to the courts, appeared in 
those courts, and have presented arguments. They have not been deprived of any equal 
protection under the laws of the United States of America. 
The Thomasons' only argument that remotely supports their conclusory statements about 
equal protection is that the district court violated equal protection by "not dismissing the 
[Bagleys'] case and voiding any and all relief to the [Bagleys]." (Appellant Br. at 42). 
However, this asserted error does not rise to the level of violating equal protection. In fact, after 
the case was remanded the Thomasons never requested dismissal of the Bagleys' lawsuit. The 
Thomasons objected to the Bagleys' motions, it is true; however, they never affirmatively 
requested that the district court dismiss the quiet title action. And even if they had made such a 
request, the Thomasons do not present the Court with any authority remotely suggesting that the 
failure to dismiss a case violates equal protection. Equal protection is designed to prevent 
discrimination in the nations' laws. The Thomasons never raise any argument or authority 
identifying how the current laws discriminate against the Thomasons in any way. Therefore, the 
Court should reject the arguments pertaining to equal protection. 
B. The Bagleys are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
The Thomasons' appeal is frivolous. There are no fairly debatable issues presented to the 
Court. The Thomasons focus on issues resolved in the prior appeal and never assign error to the 
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district court's decision to grant the Bagleys' motion for judgment on the pleadings and enter a 
final judgment. The Thomasons failure to articulate any justifiable basis for the appeal should 
leave the Court with an abiding belief that the appeal is frivolous, lacks merit, and is intended 
solely to harass the Bagleys. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which 
otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is 
defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, 
the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 12-121 (2012). The Court has previously held that under§ 12-121, a party 
is entitled to attorney's fees "if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
and without foundation." Kelley v. Yadon, 150 Idaho 334, 338, 247 P.3d 199, 203 (2011) (citing 
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181P.3d435, 440 (2007)). The Court has stated that 
attorney fees on appeal are awarded under this statute when the Court is "left with an abiding belief 
that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." 
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 188, 219 P.3d 1192, 1204 (2009) (citing Burns v. Baldwin, 138 
Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d 502, 509 (2003)). Further, the party seeking fees must "support the claim 
with argument as well as authority." Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 228, 254 P.3d 1219, 1224 
(2011) (citing Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 176, 219 P.3d 1188, 1192 (2009)). Thus, a 
prevailing party that properly supports its request with both authority and argument may be awarded 
attorney fees when the appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
Here, the Bagleys prevailed in all of the proceedings before the district court. They acquired 
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all of the relief that they sought from the district court. The Thomasons received no relief and their 
counterclaims were all dismissed. The Thomasons have not supported their appeal with any coherent 
arguments or authority that would tend to suggest a legitimate basis for the appeal. In the absence of 
authority or argument, the Court should be left with an abiding belief in the frivolity of the 
Thomasons' appeal. The Court should, therefore, rule in the Bagleys' favor and deny all of the relief 
sought on appeal by the Thomasons. ln the even that the Court rules in the Bagleys' favor, it should 
award the Bagleys' their attorney fees based on § 12-121. 
Section 12-121 is specifically designed to compensate parties who are dragged into the legal 
process by another party where there is no fair or reasonable dispute. This appeal is just such a case 
where this Court has already resolved the issues being argued by the Thomasons. Asking this Court 
to "second guess" the decision of the lower court without more justifies an award of attorney fees 
under§ 12-12 l. That is precisely what the Thomasons are asking this Court to do along with 
revisiting the Court's prior decisions in Bagley I & II. "Normally, this Court will award attorney 
fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 if the appeal merely invites the Court to reweigh the evidence or 
second guess the lower court, or if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
or without foundation." Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 272 P.3d 527, 534 (Idaho 2012). The 
Thomasons appeal is frivolous and attorney fees should be awarded to the Bagleys based on 
Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court's orders should be affirmed. The Bagleys should be awarded their 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
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DATED: October 2, 2012. DATED: October 2, 2012. 
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